President Xi, Tear Down This “Great Firewall”
A Disruptive Technology Solution for the 21st Century: “Voice of America 2.0”
Is this the same attitude that blindsided us to Imperial Japan, 1950s North Korea and the Vietcong? China is the real threat and why are we so oblivious?
Bill Gertz, in his book, iWar: War and Peace in the Information Age, outlined an “…information warfare strategy to mitigate the [cyber] threats,” (Gertz, 2017). His overall approach toward worldwide cyber actors, to include China, relies on Soft Cyber Power (SCP). SCP reverts to the military’s deep-dive in the 1990’s with the works of Alvin and Heidi Toffler regarding Information Operations (IO) and dominance. There work is still the basis of much of the US’s current approach to cybersecurity offensive and defensive thought-processes.
VOA 2.0
Gertz suggests that the US return to its place in information operation dominance as a major solution to capturing the “hearts and minds” of the enemy. He suggests the reinvigoration of the US Information Agency (USIA) which its most notable role was broadcasting communications to varied global totalitarian nations under the name of “Voice of America” –it was abolished in 1999. For the purposes of this discussion, the creation of a strategic next-step technical solution is identified as Voice of America 2.0 (VOA 2.0).
VOA 2.0 is an advanced technology and disruptive technological solution. It is designed to weaken Chinese leadership’s control of information dissemination to its citizenry. It is intended to provide unfettered access to the Internet and bypass a dictatorial nations from interference by its censors or blocking technologies.
VOA 2.0 would provide global high-speed satellite Internet to the world, and more specifically the people of China. The objective is to emplace a constellation of satellites that would provide secure and uninhibited communications to undermine the Communist Chinese’s “Great Firewall;” a firewall tightly controlled by the Chinese to manage the information flow entering and leaving its borders.
VOA 2.0 would also be the vehicle to “broadcast” a truthful—much as advocated by Bill Gertz–an honest representation of US core interests and values with respect to China. This is not about deception or False-Flag Operations (FFO). It will not create less-than truthful narratives, (Schultz, 2015), that would undermine the long-term desired outcome of ending Communist China. Any deception operation if too quickly attempted would be seen by the average Chinese as propaganda and falsehood. If the US employed it too slowly, the US efforts would appear both inconsistent and insincere. This would not meet the desired outcomes sought. Any effort must be couched in the truth, and avoid any hyperbole or partial truths.
Additionally, a US governmental body would also need to be established—a rebirth of Voice of America via the global Internet. Such an organization would exploit the VOA 2.0 medium and such Internet resources to include social media and open news sources from across the globe. “[Social Media] is a powerful tool with great potential for information warfare,” (Gertz, 2017); this method reflects Gertz’s own plan to make this a war of ideas. The disruption to the Communist Chinese government’s ability to control the information flow to its citizenry would be revolutionary. It would create an open environment that would potentially end Chinese communism similarly to the demise of the former Soviet Union.
Defeating US threats require a new approach to both past strategies and technologies; both will not require armed conflict. They require the avid and thoughtful employment of SCP, through an active IO plan, that holistically dissuades Chinese government hackers, and also their military forces to discontinue any current or future kinetic or virtual attack. VOA 2.0 would be that much needed and more expansive core technological solution that would be the major means to weaken China ideologically.
Defeating an Ideology
So how does the US fight the Chinese Communist ideology? The US should recognize and declare to the world that the ideology of communism is a failed one (once again) in any form. It is important to convey this information as was once done regarding a failed former Soviet Union. It can express that failure using ideas transmitted across an open and free Internet. That battle must be executed at the highest levels of US government to include the communications from the president to the Chinese people directly.
Furthermore, as Reagan designated the Soviet Union, the current Administration should also declare a new “Evil in Cyberspace:” China. The direct confrontation on ideology is not just the identification of enemies but the actual and perceived threats to their preeminence. “In short, the United States has to help defeat an ideology, not just a group of people,” (Gorka, 2014).
The Tactical Fight
“Social Media is key to interdiction,” (Gorka & Gorka, 2015). Similar to how the previous rendition of VOA existed after World War II to espouse democratic ideas freely across unrestricted airwaves, VOA 2.0 will employ experts in Chinese language and culture to communicate with the Chinese people openly and freely across Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc. This effort would require the employment of individuals that can express freely the truths and failings of the communist ideology.
The ideas of freedom in a restrictive regime will help shift the Chinese from a centralized and plutocratic government to a more preferable free and “democratic” society. While the Chinese Communist Party espouses equality for all, the VOA 2.0 solution would erode the bedrock of this regime. The objective is to ultimately neutralize the government’s efforts to quash the exchange of information and ideas freely within China’s borders and among its people.
The like tactics as described by Dr. Gorka: “truthfulness and bringing others into the fight,” should be used to defeat the Chinese. Using the same tenets of exploiting social media against ISIS, the US can do the same against the Chinese. It will help accelerate the defeat of China at the tactical through strategic level by the employment of elements of US power. This would comprise all facets of US power to include especially the power of information over a truly open Internet for the Chinese.
Conclusion
As Bill Gertz suggested, the US cannot quietly stand by as the Chinese steal US ideas, innovations and technologies. It will require a “soft”offensive response through a coordinated message and access to unfettered information by the Chinese people. “Unless we punch back, we will continue to get hit,” (Gertz, 2017).
Destroying the Chinese “machine” in cyber space will require attacking them strategically, ideologically, and tactically. Strategically, it will require the US with its allies to deploy global Internet access via the VOA 2.0 solution. It will require an ideological assault on the failures of communism through an open dialog across an open and uncensored Internet. Finally, it will require a tactical communications plan designating China as the premier cyber enemy; doing such will erode their power. It may also result in its like end much like that demise of the former Soviet Union.
It will be through an active, and non-kinetic cyber actions that will defeat the Chinese ongoing cyber threat to the US and the world. The introduction of a disruptive technological solution, such as VOA 2.0, will provide the Chinese people access to information and knowledge about their repressive government. It potentially will provide the impetus to topple Beijing courtesy of cyberspace.
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Ms. Columbus has worked in the Intelligence Community (IC) for over 20 years. She retired from the US Air Force in 2014 after working as a Senior Advisor providing authoritative advice on all aspects of Cyberspace operations, force structure and organizational concepts. She oversaw strategic support activities to enable the right mix of cyber capabilities for future operations.
